I. INTRODUCTION
Banking and financial regulation-which I'll hereafter refer to simply as financial regulation-is needed because the financial system provides functions that are essential to economic development. The principal function is the aggregation of moneys and the allocation thereof for productive projects. Although each nation regulates banking and finance in its own ways, the universal nature of finance drives a natural convergence in the nature of financial regulation. This chapter thus focuses on the universal principles of financial regulation.
A. Banking
Traditionally, financial regulation focused on banking because banks historically have been the primary entities that have aggregated moneys-primarily by taking deposits from customers-and then allocated such monies-primarily by making loansto borrowers to invest in productive projects, such as factories. Traditional financial regulation therefore is geared to ensuring that deposit-taking banks can continue to perform these functions efficiently.
B. Shadow Banking
In recent years, non-banks have increasingly begun replacing ("disintermediating") traditional banks as the intermediaries of funds-that is, the entities that aggregate moneys and then allocate such monies to firms to invest in productive projects. Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to this process of disintermediation. The size of the shadow-banking sector-which includes securitization, money-market mutual funds, hedge funds, securities lending, asset-backed commercial paper ("ABCP") 2 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW 619 (2012-13) . conduits, structured investment vehicles ("SIVs"), and repo financing-was estimated at $60 trillion worldwide in December 2011. 3 More recent estimates suggest an even higher number. 4 Several reasons, including efficiency and regulatory arbitrage, account for the rapid rise of shadow banking. Shadow banking can be efficient because disintermediation removes traditional banks as the "middleman" of funding, thereby avoiding the profit mark-up that banks charge on their loans. Furthermore, in markets where traditional banks cannot flexibly operate due to overly restrictive regulation, shadow banks can help to fund unmet demands. 5 The response to Regulation Q in the United States is but one example of this. Regulation Q imposed limits on the interest rates that banks could pay to depositors, creating an unmet demand-especially by institutional depositors-for higher returns. That demand sparked the rise of money-market mutual funds, which offered much higher rates of return than bank deposits. . 4 See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT (2012) , http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf (estimating shadow banking's worldwide assets as $67 trillion in 2011). Cf. Sheridan Prasso, Shadow Banking, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2014) , http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/shadowbanking/ (reporting that the Financial Stability Board believes that shadow banking grew by $5 trillion in 2012 to $71 trillion). 5 Timothy Lane, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, "Shedding Light on Shadow Banking," Speech to the CFA Society & FIN. 131, 138 (2011) . Sometimes, however, shadow banking can result from pure regulatory arbitrage, without efficiency considerations. For example, in the context of mortgage lending, bank holding companies (BHCs) can lend through affiliated depository institutions (ADIs) or affiliated mortgage companies (AMCs). Whereas ADIs are chartered and subject to banking regulations, including capital requirements, underwriting requirements, and strict accounting practices, AMCs are not subject to any such regulation. Yuliya Demyanyk & Elena Loutskina, Mortgage Companies and Regulatory Arbitrage 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 12-20R 2014) , available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2012/wp1220r.pdf. By using an AMC Regardless of the reasons for the rise of shadow banking, the failure of financial regulation to adequately address that rise "is widely believed to have contributed to the buildup of risks in the financial system in the period leading up to" the 2008 global financial crisis (the "financial crisis"). 7 Financial regulation must also focus on shadow banking.
C. Some Fundamentals
Actual financial regulation tends to be imperfect. Policymakers and regulators tend to respond to the media, which can create distortions by emphasizing what journalists find accessible. Furthermore, after a financial crisis, people naturally want to prevent the next crisis. Regulators, who are themselves usually subject to political shorttermism, typically respond by focusing on preventative regulation, or at least regulation aimed at preventing the next financial meltdown. But that focus is insufficient because it is impossible to always predict the cause of the next financial crisis.
Moreover, financial regulation is often tethered to the financial architecture-the particular design and structure of financial firms, markets, and other related institutionsat the time the regulation is promulgated. Ongoing monitoring and updating of that regulation can be costly, however, and is subject to political interference at each updating the goal of macroprudential regulation is to prevent "systemic" risk. As will be discussed, there is some overlap in these terms.
II. MICROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
As mentioned, microprudential regulation focuses on ensuring that firms and markets, the components of the financial system, can efficiently perform their underlying economic functions. In general, firms and markets operate efficiently absent "market"
failures; hence the goal of microprudential financial regulation is to correct market failures.
A. Correcting Market Failures
1. Information Failure. A key market failure is information failure, which can undermine the reliability of pricing. Funding depends on reliable pricing. Regulation could therefore improve funding by correcting this market failure.
The principal information failure is information asymmetry, referring to parties to a transaction having different amounts of relevant information. For example, an issuer of financial securities usually has more (and better) information than investors in the securities about the risks.
Increasing financial complexity is exacerbating this failure, by undermining disclosure, which since the securities laws of the 1930s has been the chief regulatory tool to reduce information asymmetry. Securities laws generally rely on disclosure, but some financial structures are getting so complex that they are effectively incomprehensible. It may even be rational sometimes for an investor to invest in high-yield complex securities without fully understanding them. There may be many reasons for this. For example, the investor simply may not have the staffing to evaluate the securities, whereas failure in invest would appear to-and in fact could-competitively prejudice the investor vis-à-vis others who invest. 8 Thus, many institutional investors-including even the largest, most sophisticated, firms-bought complex mortgage-backed securities prior to the financial crisis without fully understanding them.
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Financial complexity is inevitable. Profit opportunities are inherent in complexity, due in part to investor demand for securities that more precisely match their risk and reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage increases complexity as market participants take advantage of inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across national borders.
And new technologies continue to add complexity not only to financial products but also to financial markets. Complexity may well be the greatest future challenge for financial regulation.
2. Rationality Failure. Another market failure is rationality failure, which can also undermine the reliability of pricing. Even in financial markets, humans have bounded rationality. In areas of complexity, for example, we tend to overrely on heuristicsbroadly defined as simplifications of reality that allow us to make decisions in spite of our limited ability to process information. Modern finance has become so complex that the financial community routinely relies on heuristic-based customs, such as determining creditworthiness of securities by relying on formalistic credit ratings and assessing risk on financial products by relying on simplified mathematical models. Market participants also follow the herd in their investment choices and are prone to panic. Furthermore, they are unrealistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events with which they have The discussion so far has addressed how microprudential regulation can mitigate market failures. Microprudential regulation can also address market failures more broadly by ensuring that firms can resist the adverse impact of market failures.
1. Capital Requirements. The most common way that regulation accomplishes this is by imposing "capital" requirements, which are intended to protect financial institutions against unexpected losses. Capital requirements in their modern form-based on ratios 22 
Id. Cf. GORDON DE BROUWER, HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 150 (2001)
(noting that "even rational market participants may at times ignore their own private information and follow the actions of earlier participants because the [perceived] information in other people's collective actions overwhelms the individual's private information."). More crassly, an investor may rationalize that it will be in no worse position than its competitors, who are making these same kinds of investments, if the investment fails-especially given the investment's relatively small size. Even if that rationalization is justified at the outset, however, continuing competitive pressures may motivate the investor to increase the investment, especially where approval of the initial investment sets an institutional precedent that makes further approvals easier. Marginalizing Risk, supra note 15. 23 For a discussion of how to design that regulation, see id.
(arguing that although regulatory responses may be second best, imperfect regulation may well be preferable to limiting risk dispersion because the latter could inadvertently increase the potential for regulatory arbitrage, increase financial instability, and impair the ability of parties to achieve negotiated market efficiencies).
rather than fixed dollar amounts-were introduced into banking regulation in the 1980s.
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In that form, the requirements are expressed as capital-adequacy ratios: the minimum ratio of equity (including equity-like securities) that a bank must hold as a percentage of risk-weighted assets.
The imposition of capital requirements at the national level created a collective action problem: banks subject to those requirements might become less competitive, at least from a cost standpoint, than banks in nations that did not impose such requirements (or that imposed less strict requirements). In response, bank regulators around the world began to work together, through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter, "BCBS"), 25 to try to develop uniform capital requirements.
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In 1988, the BCBS released the Basel Capital Accord (hereinafter, "Basel I"), which set minimum capital-adequacy ratios for international banks in countries enacting
Basel I into law. Over 100 countries enacted Basel I or at least principles based on Basel I.
27
Basel I took a two-tiered approach to defining "capital." Tier 1 capital included widely recognized forms of equity, such as shareholder's equity and retained earnings.
Tier 2 included more controversial forms of equity, such as undisclosed reserves, assetrevaluation reserves, general loan-loss reserves, subordinated debt, and certain hybrid 2013-29, at 34 (2013) (discussing how bank regulators switched from using capital requirements based on fixed dollar amounts to capital requirements based on the ratio of capital to total assets, and how the Basel I Accord spread that latter regulatory approach internationally). 25 Established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten, the BCBS "provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters" and its objective is to "enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide." The BCBS has no formal authority; it leaves the implementation of recommendations to individual countries. (debt/equity) capital instruments. Basel I required internationally active banks to maintain "total" capital-restricted to Tier 1 capital and a potentially discounted amount of Tier 2 capital 28 -equal to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. Assets-which in the case of banks are primarily loans payable to the banks-were risk-weighted according to five categories, depending on the generic type of the asset (and not, for example, the particular creditworthiness the borrower on a loan).
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Less than ten years after the release of Basel I, the BCBS began rethinking how to improve capital-adequacy ratios. Basel I's weaknesses included the bluntness of its riskweighting of assets and its exclusive focus on credit risk. 30 Experience also showed that Basel I encouraged regulatory arbitrage, such as banks engaging in securitization transactions instead of making loans. 31 The result was the release in 2004 of the Revised Basel Capital Accord (hereinafter, "Basel II").
Basel II retained some elements of Basel I, including the definition of capital and the 8% requirement. However, it took a broader view of risk, including not only credit risk (the risk that a borrower will not repay its loan) but also market risk (the risk that the market value of an asset will decline) and operational risk (the "risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events").
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Further, Basel II introduced a three-pillar regulatory structure, explained below, based on
(1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review, and (3) market discipline. The first pillar-minimum capital requirements-addressed credit, market, and operational risk. Banks had to take all of these risks into account when calculating their minimum capital requirement. Unlike Basel I, however, Basel II gave banks the option of assessing credit risks through one of two internal ratings-based procedures or under a standardized approach using external credit rating agencies. 33 The second pillarsupervisory review-set forth guidelines for how banks should engage in risk assessment, emphasizing monitoring, early intervention, and prompt remedial action to prevent the capital-adequacy ratio from slipping below the 8% minimum. 34 The third pillar-market discipline-focused on requiring banks to formally disclose their risks to the marketplace, thereby providing other banks and market participants with information needed to negotiate contract terms that, effectively, should reward healthy banks and penalize risky banks. . 3, 2014) . 41 "The concept of Tier 1 that we are familiar with will continue to exist and will include common equity and other instruments that have a loss-absorbing capacity on a "going concern" basis, for example certain preference shares. Innovative capital instruments which were permitted in limited amount as part of Tier 1 capital will no longer be permitted and those currently in existence will be phased out. 
III. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Macroprudential regulation refers to financial regulation of the financial system's ability to function as a network, within which firms and markets can operate. As discussed, its primary goal is to prevent systemic risk. Ideal macroprudential regulation would therefore act ex ante, limiting the triggers of systemic shocks.
A. Limiting the Triggers of Systemic Shocks.
1. Maturity Transformation. Several vulnerabilities of the financial system can trigger systemic shocks. The classic vulnerability is maturity transformation: the assetliability mismatch that results from the short-term funding of long-term projects. This mismatch creates a "liquidity default risk" that borrowers will be unable to repay their lenders. According to some scholars, illiquidity is the fundamental source of financial failure. 63 Weber, supra note 60, at 2292. Banks with more than $10 billion (previously the threshold was $50 billion) in assets are now required to have two stress tests performed annually, one done internally and one conducted by regulators. 64 Jeff Black & Sonia Sirletti, ECB Plans to Limit Stress-Test Inputs in Bank Checks, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2014, 11:09 AM) , http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-11/ecb-plans-to-limit-stress-test-inputs-inbank-checks.html (describing the European Central Bank's plan to conduct stress tests of euro-area lenders).
A bank "run" is the typical (though far from the only) example of maturity transformation leading to a liquidity default. In a bank run, panicked depositors will collectively demand their money. If, as is usual, the long-term maturities of the bank's assets cannot generate cash quickly enough to pay the current depositor demands, the bank will default. And if (again, as is usual) the defaulting bank is interconnected with other banks, the defaulting bank's failure to pay its obligations to those other banks can, in turn, deprive those other banks of money to pay their creditors-with the chain spreading. Maturity transformation was also at the core of the financial crisis, such as the well-known shadow-banking example, discussed below, of money-market mutual funds that used short-term loans by investors, essentially withdrawable on demand, to fund long-term projects.
In mid-September 2008, a money-market mutual fund in the United States "broke the buck" for the first time in fourteen years. 65 This meant that the fund's price per share, or net asset value ("NAV"), fell below $1.00-the point at which fund investors will begin losing money. Because shares in mutual funds were not then U.S. government insured, 66 fund investors industrywide raced to try to withdraw their investments from any remaining short-term assets-the effective equivalent of a bank run-before other investors depleted those assets. 67 To mitigate potential systemic consequences, the U.S.
government stepped in to guarantee money-market mutual fund share prices, thereby calming investors and quelling the run. (2014) (also noting that the money-market mutual funds were unable to secure short-term credit to meet the sudden demand). 68 Id.
Maturity transformation is thus a vulnerability of the financial system, but it is also a benefit. Using short-term debt to fund long-term projects is attractive because, if managed to avoid a default, it tends to lower the cost of borrowing. The interest rate on short-term debt is usually lower than that on long-term debt because, other things being equal, it is easier to assess a borrower's ability to repay in the short term than in the long term, and long-term debt carries greater interest-rate risk.
Regulation should not, therefore, attempt to prohibit maturity transformation per se. In a banking context, for example, the standard regulatory solution is not to require banks to match-fund their assets. Rather, governments often provide deposit insurance that limits the likelihood that depositors will panic.
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In other contexts, however, maturity transformation may well remain a real vulnerability. Because many shadow-banking sources of funding, such as short-term commercial paper, are not payable on demand-and thus are not subject to the same type of "run" risk as traditional deposits-deposit insurance is not a solution. And other regulatory solutions are likely to be imperfect. 70 Depending on how it is designed, regulation protecting the financial system against maturity-transformation risk can increase moral hazard, which in turn can motivate risky actions by shadow banks. For example, regulation that protects the shadow-bank issuer of short-term securities against its own risky actions would almost certainly increase moral hazard. Regulation that limits incentives for shadow banks to engage in maturity transformation-such as imposing higher capital requirements on firms that engage in maturity transformation- 69 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 70 In the context of money-market mutual funds, for example, regulators have been debating potential reforms for years. In July 2014, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") announced regulatory reforms to be implemented in two years, but the regulation remains controversial. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC's long path to money market fund reform ends in compromise, REUTERS (July 23, 2014, 5:16 PM) , http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/23/us-sec-moneyfundsidUSKBN0FS08E20140723. See also supra notes 3, 6, & 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of money-market mutual funds and shadow banking.
would reduce moral hazard but would also reduce the economic efficiency achieved by maturity transformation.
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Thus, the liquidity default risk that inevitably remains can trigger systemic shocks. Indeed, the failure of pre-financial-crisis regulation to adequately address liquidity default risk resulting from shadow banking's maturity transformation "is widely believed to have contributed to the buildup of risks in the financial system in the period leading up to" that crisis.
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2. Limited Liability. Another vulnerability is the financial system's failure to require market participants to fully internalize their harm. As a result, they are economically motivated to engage in risky but profitable transactions because much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be externalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse.
The most direct regulatory solution should therefore be to require market participants to internalize that harm. For various reasons, including the longstanding limited liability accorded corporate shareholders throughout the world, that may not be feasible. With the rise of shadow banking, limited liability is becoming especially problematic. For the small and decentralized firms (such as hedge funds) that dominate the shadow-banking sector, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives these investor-managers strong incentives to take risks that could generate out-size personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk.
71 A possible compromise might be regulation that protects not individual shadow banks but the overall markets for short-term securities, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility put into place by the U.S. Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to protect the commercial paper market. I later discuss this in Part III.C.2, infra. 72 Regulating Ex Post, supra note 7, at 85.
3. Other Vulnerabilities. The very nature of the financial system also subjects it to other systemic vulnerabilities that cannot be regulated away. 73 Because the financial system exhibits the characteristics of-and effectively comprises-a high-risk system that is susceptible to "normal accidents," regulators cannot predict, and therefore cannot eliminate, all the triggers of systemic shocks. Another reason why regulators cannot realistically eliminate all of the triggers of systemic shocks is that certain of the market failures that are the subject of imperfect microprudential regulation could even trigger systemic failures. For example, information failure, rationality failure, agency failure, and risk marginalization could, individually or in combination, cause one or more large financial firms to overinvest, leading to bankruptcy; and the bankruptcy of a large, interconnected financial firm could lead to a systemic collapse. It therefore is virtually certain that the financial system will face systemic shocks from time to time.
B. Existing Macroprudential Regulatory Approaches.
Since the financial crisis, policymakers and regulators generally recognize the need for macroprudential regulation. However, they tend to approach it as constituting a loose assortment of "tools" in their "toolkit." The macroprudential 'toolkit' generally comprises cross-sectoral leverage ceilings, credit and credit-growth ceilings, reserve and capital buffer requirements, liquidity minima and maturity mismatch maxima, dynamic countercyclical provisioning, and surveillance and data collection. 74 It is still unclear, though, which "tools" should be used in which circumstances, or as to how the tools should be calibrated. That itself creates risk because the misapplication of these toolssuch as imposing excessively restrictive leverage or credit and credit-growth ceilingsmay be as likely to cause financial problems as to solve them. The misapplication of capital requirements could also backfire. The regulatory reform dialogue increasingly is focusing on a countercyclical and flexible approach to capital requirements. 77 Finance, and especially banking, is by nature procyclical: the increased availability of capital stimulates economic growth. 78 Historically, financial regulation has tended to be procyclical as well-loosening during booms and becoming stricter after crises. 79 The rationale for countercyclical capital requirements is that they would help to moderate economic growth, discouraging the buildup of imbalances during economic booms and bubbles (by reducing excessive risk-taking and credit expansion). It therefore is clear that, notwithstanding the best efforts of regulators, the financial system will inevitably face systemic shocks. Accordingly, macroprudential regulation should also work ex post-after a systemic shock is triggered-to break the transmission of the shock and limit its impact. This approach accords with chaos theory, which addresses the problem of inevitable systemic shocks in complex engineering systems. The most successful (complex) systems are those in which the consequences of failures are limited. Regulation could help to stabilize systemically important firms and markets by requiring them to be more internally robust. Financial regulation has long focused on requiring traditional deposit-taking banks to be robust, usually through capital and solvency requirements. Since the financial crisis, the United States, the European Union, and other jurisdictions are beginning to also subject "systemically important" non-bank financial firms ("SIFI"s) to a range of capital, solvency, and similar requirements.
This approach is imperfect, however, because it mixes the goals of macroprudential and microprudential regulation. The microprudential goal is to assure that individual firms can continue operating. By subjecting banks and SIFIs to rigorous capital, solvency, and similar requirements (to assure that they can continue operating), that microprudential goal inadvertently becomes a goal of the macroprudential regulation.
The flaw in this mixed approach is that macroprudential regulation's only goal should be to protect the financial system's overall capacity to function as a network.
Macroprudential regulation need not, therefore, impose capital or solvency requirements on individual firms-even those that are systemically important-so long as it otherwise 88 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (discussing ring-fencing). 89 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
achieves that goal. This regulatory flexibility is important because capital and solvency requirements do not always efficiently reduce systemic risk.
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Other potential approaches to make systemically important firms more internally robust include requiring at least some portion of the firm's debt to be in the form of socalled contingent capital. Contingent capital debt would automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence of pre-agreed events.
As a parallel to stabilizing systemically important firms by requiring them to be more internally robust, regulation could help to stabilize systemically important financial markets by requiring them also to be more internally robust. For example, increased speed in data transmission is generally associated with market efficiency, but the extreme speeds at which algorithmic trading takes place creates a danger of market collapse. In response, securities market regulators have been proposing the adoption of circuitbreaker rules to at least temporarily halt trading under specified circumstances.
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms and markets by providing appropriate liquidity. Liquidity has traditionally been used, especially by government central banks acting as lenders of last resort, to help prevent financial firms from defaulting. Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms could follow this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least be partly privatized by taxing those firms to create a systemic risk fund. Privatizing the source of liquidity would likewise help to internalize externalities, thereby not only offsetting the cost to taxpayers of liquidity advances that are not repaid but also, if structured appropriately, reducing moral hazard by discouraging fund contributors-including those that believe they are "too big to fail"-from engaging in financially risky activities.
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Because financial markets can also be triggers and transmitters of systemic shocks, liquidity should be used to stabilize systemically important financial markets. For example, in response to the post-Lehman collapse of the commercial paper market, the U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility ("CPFF") to act as a lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing "temporary liquidity distortions" by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not otherwise sell their paper. The CPFF helped to stabilize the commercial paper market.
IV. CONCLUSION
Banking and financial regulation is needed to protect the financial system, which provides functions that are essential to economic development. Traditionally, financial regulation focused on banking because banks historically have aggregated moneys (primarily by taking deposits from customers) and then allocated those monies (by making loans to borrowers). Traditional financial regulation is geared to ensuring that deposit-taking banks can continue to perform these functions efficiently. In recent years, however, shadow banking has begun to overtake traditional banking. Financial regulation must therefore also address shadow banking.
Regardless of whether it addresses traditional or shadow banking, financial regulation has two overall goals: to ensure that the components of the financial system- 
